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MAKING PEACE WITH MORAL IMPERFECTION
The Problem of Temporal Asymmetry
Camil Golub
he following scenario should be familiar to many readers. Some-
one believes that they made a significant moral mistake at some point in 
their life. They strongly prefer not to make similar mistakes again. And 
yet, thinking about what might have been, they do not wish that they had done 
things differently in the past. Here are some examples:
Acting: Greta accepted an acting gig with a director who she knew had 
been accused of sexual misconduct. She believes that it was wrong of her 
to take the job, and would not make a similar decision again. However, 
looking back, she does not wish that she had never worked with that di-
rector.1
Lying: Tyler lied about his credentials on a job application years ago. He 
believes it was wrong of him to lie, and has resolved not to make similar 
mistakes again. However, he does not wish that he had never lied on that 
job application.
How can people like Greta and Tyler rationally make peace with their past mor-
al failings, while committing to avoid similar mistakes in the future? This is what 
I call the problem of temporal asymmetry for our attitudes toward moral imper-
fection.
Note that, by making peace with a moral mistake, I mean having a retrospec-
tive preference for one’s actual life path, when comparing it to nearby worlds in 
which one would not have made that mistake. Similarly, I take regret for a past 
mistake to be a retrospective preference for the closest world in which one did 
not make that mistake. Such global preferences about the past, which concern 
entire life paths, should be distinguished from local retrospective preferences, 
1 This example is inspired by a New York Times interview with Greta Gerwig, in which she dis-
cussed her conflicted feelings about a similar episode in her career. Nevertheless, it should 
be treated as fictional.
T
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e.g., wishing that a particular event had not happened, considering it in isolation, 
and holding fixed everything else about one’s life. I will have little to say about 
the second type of preference in what follows.2
Preferring retrospectively one’s actual life path is also different from finding 
emotional closure with the past, and regret as a retrospective preference should 
not be confused with the affective states typically associated with it, such as 
guilt and shame. Someone can make peace with a moral failing, in the sense de-
scribed above, while still thinking about what might have been, and even feeling 
guilty or ashamed about that mistake. I do not mean to dismiss the significance 
of such emotions in our ethical lives, but I will focus on preferences regarding 
moral imperfection because they are more clearly subject to norms of rationality, 
and they give rise to our puzzle: How can we rationally prefer our imperfect past, 
while preferring to do the right thing in the future?3
I should also clarify what I mean by moral mistake. I have in mind cases where 
one did something morally wrong, and the moral disvalue of said act was not 
outweighed by the agent’s self-interest or any other kind of nonmoral value, such 
as one’s practical identity or ground projects.4 In other words, I am focusing on 
cases where, by the agent’s own lights, one ought to have done the morally right 
thing, all things considered.
Moreover, I am not talking about cases where one had subjective reasons to 
do the morally right thing in the past, i.e.,  reasons relative to what one could 
reasonably expect at the time of action, but retrospectively one can identify ob-
jective reasons that justify one’s moral transgression, such as the long-term pos-
itive impact of that mistake on the agent’s well-being. Rather, I am focusing on 
cases where the agent believes that she objectively ought to have done the right 
thing, and yet retrospectively prefers the life path in which she acted wrongly, 
while wanting to avoid similar mistakes in the future.
Finally, when I say that the agent wants to do the right thing if she is to face 
similar circumstances again, I have in mind cases where the overall balance 
between moral reasons and other types of value would be the same as for the 
2 In Wallace’s terms, I will focus on all-in regret, rather than regrets, for past mistakes (The 
View from Here).
3 In taking regret to be a retrospective preference, I am following, e.g., Harman, “‘I’ll Be Glad 
I Did It’ Reasoning and the Significance of Future Desires” and “Transformative Experienc-
es and Reliance on Moral Testimony”; and Wallace, The View from Here. This conception of 
regret diverges from some recent literature in moral psychology, where regret is understood 
as an emotion. See, e.g., Morton, “Cousins of Regret”; and Priest, “Reasonable Regret.”
4 See Williams, “Persons, Character, and Morality”; Wolf, “Moral Saints”; and Frankfurt, 
“The Importance of What We Care About,” for canonical arguments to the effect that moral 
demands may be outweighed by other types of value in our lives.
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agent’s past mistake. So the temporal asymmetry in Acting, for instance, cannot 
be explained by the fact that Greta’s retrospective preference concerns an entire 
section of her life, while the prospective preference focuses on a particular ac-
tion. By hypothesis, Greta wants to do the right thing in the future, even if doing 
the wrong thing again were to bring the same type of long-term consequences as 
her past mistake.5 How can this prospective attitude be reconciled with Greta’s 
retrospective preference for her actual life path?
A good answer to this problem should accommodate the fact that people 
often do regret their moral mistakes, and reasonably so. That is, we need an ac-
count that would explain why, e.g., Greta’s lack of regret is rationally permissible, 
while allowing that regret for past mistakes is also permissible. Moreover, such 
regret might even be rationally required if one’s moral failings are grave enough.6
Here is the answer that I will defend. Two kinds of attachments can justify 
conservative attitudes about past moral mistakes, without shifting retrospective-
ly the balance of objective reasons for our actions, and without providing equal 
support for wanting to be morally imperfect in the future: personal attachments 
to relationships, projects, and other particular valuable things in our past, and 
a commitment to our biographical identity. That is, we can rationally prefer a 
life path marked by significant moral failings if we give enough weight to the 
personal attachments that those mistakes enabled, and to the way in which said 
mistakes have shaped who we are. But these attachments need not change the 
fact that we ought to have done the right thing, all things considered, nor need 
they give us sufficient reason to want to do the wrong thing again in the future.7
5 Admittedly, the agent might never be in a position to know that she finds herself in such cir-
cumstances, given that this would involve being able to predict the long-term consequences 
of her actions. But this need not prevent the agent from forming a preference with respect 
to such circumstances. We can reasonably form preferences concerning situations that we 
assume would be opaque to us in relevant respects, e.g., if I ever pick a winning lottery ticket, 
I prefer not to die in a car accident before I find out about it and claim my prize.
6 Of course, this is not the kind of case on which I focus here: I want to make sense of cases 
like Acting and Lying, where the agents’ mistakes are arguably not grave enough to make 
regret obligatory.
7 The role of identity and personal value in retrospection has been explored before—see Ad-
ams, “Existence, Self-Interest, and the Problem of Evil”; Harman, “‘I’ll Be Glad I Did It’ 
Reasoning and the Significance of Future Desires” and “Transformative Experiences and 
Reliance on Moral Testimony”; Wallace, The View from Here; and Golub, “Personal Value, 
Biographical Identity, and Retrospective Attitudes.” These discussions have focused on how 
retrospective preferences can diverge from evaluative judgments about the past, where this 
includes prudential and moral judgments. There has been no comprehensive treatment of 
the problem of temporal asymmetry for our attitudes toward moral imperfection, including 
a comparison between the personal value and biographical identity proposal and alternative 
accounts of such attitudes. This is what my paper will provide.
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In section 1, I will examine some views on how we can reasonably make 
peace with our moral failings that cannot support a temporal asymmetry in our 
attitudes, such as the idea that we can rationally prefer our imperfect past from 
a self-interested standpoint, even if we believe that, all things considered, we 
ought to have acted morally. This discussion will help show that, in cases that 
give rise to our puzzle, conservative attitudes about the past must be supported 
by attachments to particular bearers of nonmoral value, rather than indicating 
the weight that one gives to certain types of nonmoral value, or any general atti-
tude toward moral imperfection.
In section 2, I will discuss some views on making peace with moral imper-
fection that do allow for a temporal difference in our attitudes: (i) it is irrational 
to wish that we had done things differently, because we cannot do anything to 
change the past; (ii) it is rational to prefer that bad things be in our past rather 
than our future; (iii) regret for our past mistakes is undesirable because psycho-
logically harmful; and (iv) we can rationally affirm our imperfect past because 
we learn from our mistakes. None of these proposals, I will argue, properly ac-
counts for our asymmetric attitudes toward moral imperfection. This discussion 
too will help me isolate some virtues of the view that I favor, such as its ability to 
account for cases where people reasonably regret their past mistakes.
In section 3, I will elaborate on the positive proposal. In particular, I will say 
more about the normative force of my claims and the nature of biographical 
identity, and will briefly address a skeptical challenge to the effect that autobi-
ographical stories are too unreliable to serve as a foundation for conservative 
attitudes about the past.
1. Temporally Neutral Views on Moral Imperfection
Ordinary discourse about morality is full of reminders that we should try to 
make peace with at least some of our mistakes. We should not be too hard on 
ourselves. Nobody is perfect. To err is human. Similar ideas about moral imper-
fection can be found in philosophical literature, usually as part of a broader call 
to embrace the imperfections in our lives, where this is not limited to our moral 
flaws. 
Cheshire Calhoun, for instance, argues that it is a virtue to adopt an attitude 
of contentment toward our lives, despite their bad features, insofar as said lives 
contain plenty of good things that we ought to appreciate.8 This disposition to 
contentment, she says, is enabled by using appropriate expectation frames with 
respect to what are good enough life conditions, and extends to moral features of 
8  Calhoun, “On Being Content with Imperfection.”
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the world, including our own moral qualities. Michael Sandel holds that striving 
for perfection, in ourselves or others, indicates a lack of humility or a Promethe-
an desire for mastery over nature, and that we need to learn to accept the givens 
of human existence.9 Similarly, in theorizing about interpersonal love, Vida Yao 
articulates the notion of grace as love for the qualities of human nature, includ-
ing the flaws of one’s beloved.10 This idea would presumably extend to self-love 
as well, and thus support an attitude of acceptance toward one’s own imperfec-
tions.11
Whatever truth there might be in these ideas, they cannot explain the tem-
poral asymmetry involved in our puzzle. Insofar as we have reasons to be con-
tent with our morally imperfect lives, or to accept our flaws as a given of human 
nature, these reasons would seem to equally apply to our future moral mistakes 
as well. But again, it seems reasonable to make peace with some of our moral fail-
ings while resolving to avoid similar mistakes in the future. We cannot account 
for this by appealing to a general attitude toward moral imperfection as such.
Calhoun discusses the temporal dimension of contentment, and argues that 
her view does not condone complacency with respect to one’s moral flaws: con-
tentment with how one’s life has unfolded so far is compatible, she says, with 
being motivated to improve oneself in the future.
I agree that this combination of attitudes is rational, but I do not see how 
Calhoun’s view on contentment can account for it. If a conservative preference 
for one’s actual life path is enabled by having an expectation frame according to 
which one’s life has been good enough from a moral standpoint, despite its flaws, 
why should one not adopt a similar expectation frame with respect to one’s fu-
ture life?12
9 Sandel, The Case against Perfection. In defending his conservatism about value, Cohen, “Res-
cuing Conservatism,” also makes some remarks about accepting the given as an attitude 
worth cultivating.
10 Yao, “Grace and Alienation.”
11 Nietzsche,The Gay Science, offers a characteristically bolder view on this issue. We should 
not only accept our moral imperfections, he claims, but see them as contributing to the 
aesthetic value of our lives: “To ‘give style’ to one’s charactera great and rare art! It is prac-
ticed by those who survey all the strengths and weaknesses of their nature and then fit them 
into an artistic plan until every one of them appears as art and reason and even weaknesses 
delight the eye” (sec. 290).
12 Calhoun also proposes that we distinguish between expectation frames that govern our 
emotions toward how things are, and normative standards that determine what we should 
prefer and how we should act: this explains, she says, how we can be emotionally content 
with how our lives have gone so far while wanting to improve our condition for the future. 
But insofar as Calhoun is only interested in contentment as an emotion, her view will not of-
fer a solution to the puzzle discussed in this paper, which concerns preferences about moral 
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A different account of our conservative attitudes about the past would go 
as follows: we can reasonably prefer our actual life path from a self-interested 
standpoint, even if we accept that, all things considered, moral considerations 
outweighed the rational significance of self-interest, so we ought to have done 
things differently. In other words, we can compartmentalize retrospection into 
different sets of attitudes—e.g., self-interested, moral, all-things-considered—
and this might explain how retrospective preferences can rationally diverge from 
normative judgments about the past.13 
However, this self-interest diagnosis cannot account for the temporal asym-
metry either: if the fact that a morally imperfect life was better for us gives us rea-
son not to wish that things had gone differently, we should have equally strong 
reason to pursue a similar life path again. Nor is it plausible to say that we form 
our conservative preferences about the past from a self-interested perspective, 
but then adopt a moral or all-things-considered perspective when considering 
what we want to happen in the future. In cases like Acting or Lying, there seems 
to be no such shift between evaluative standpoints.
There is a significant difference between our evaluative perspectives on past 
and future moral mistakes, but this is not a contrast in how we weigh different 
types of value. When thinking about the past and preferring that our life unfold-
ed as it did, despite our judgment that we ought to have done things differently, 
this conservative attitude is not explained by the weight we give to self-interest 
or any other type of nonmoral value in our preferences. Again, if this were the 
explanation, the problem of temporal asymmetry would remain unsolved: by 
hypothesis, the agent wants to do the right thing in future cases that would in-
volve the same balance between morality and other kinds of value.
In order to solve our puzzle, we need to focus instead on particular things 
in our past to which we can be reasonably attached, rather than the weight we 
give to any type of value. More precisely, on the view that I defend, particular 
bearers of personal value and specific ingredients of our biographical identity 
imperfection. And if we switch our attention to normative standards governing preferences, 
again it is not clear how Calhoun’s idea of appropriate expectation frames can help solve the 
problem of temporal asymmetry. Why should we adopt standards according to which our 
lives have been morally good enough so far, despite the mistakes that we have made, but 
would not be good enough were we to make similar mistakes again?
13 This is how Parfit explains the divergence between moral judgments and retrospective 
preferences in cases that give rise to the non-identity problem: e.g., it can be rational for 
someone not to regret his own existence from a self-interested perspective, while accepting, 
from a moral standpoint, that his mother made a mistake by having him at a very young age 
(Reasons and Persons).
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are sources of support for conservative retrospective attitudes, and the temporal 
asymmetry is explained by the fact that we cannot yet be similarly attached to 
particular things in our future. 
I will develop this proposal in section 3. But first, let me examine other views 
that allow for a temporal asymmetry in our attitudes toward moral imperfection. 
I will argue that these views do not provide good answers to our puzzle: they 
either cannot explain why regret for past mistakes is often rationally permissible, 
or they do not properly account for some cases where people do not regret their 
past mistakes but want to be better in the future. 
2. What Is Special about the Past?
Someone might think that we do not need to explore what we value in our lives 
and how we value it in order to explain why it is reasonable to feel differently 
about our past and future moral failings. Perhaps the explanation is simpler: it is 
irrational to wish that we had not made the mistakes that we made, because we 
cannot do anything to change the past. But our future is still open: it is largely 
up to us whether we will make similar mistakes again. So it is rational to want to 
be morally better in the future. We could call this response to the puzzle fatalism 
about the past.14
The problem with this proposal is that we can rationally prefer that things 
had gone differently in our lives. In particular, we can reasonably regret our past 
moral mistakes. Coming up with examples of this is all too easy. For instance, I 
suspect that Christopher Wylie wishes that he had not contributed to the elec-
tion of Donald Trump by working for Cambridge Analytica, and this is a reason-
able attitude to have. The right account of these matters should make sense of 
conservative retrospective attitudes while allowing that revisionary preferences 
about the past are rationally permissible as well, and might even be required in 
some cases. Focusing on the temporal structure of agency is too blunt a tool to 
deliver this result.
Perhaps, though, a more moderate version of fatalism about the past could 
do the job. Suppose someone suggested that revisionary preferences about the 
past are rationally permissible, but only for grave moral mistakes. When it comes 
14 This should be distinguished from a global fatalism according to which everything that has 
happened and will happen to us is predetermined, so it is irrational to want the world to 
conform to our desires—a view that is often attributed to ancient Stoics like Seneca and 
Epictetus. Global fatalism might support an attitude of resignation with respect to our mor-
al flaws, but it would not help address the puzzle of temporal asymmetry. I should note in 
this context that Irvine, A Guide to the Good Life, interprets the Stoics as defending fatalism 
about the past rather than global fatalism.
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to mistakes that are below a certain threshold of severity, it is irrational to wish 
that things were different.
However, this proposal will not work either. First, the idea of a threshold 
beyond which regret for past mistakes is rationally permissible does not square 
well with what seemed to be the core underlying claim of fatalism about the past: 
that it is irrational to want the impossible. And even putting aside its ad hoc char-
acter, this moderate version of fatalism is still too strong, as it entails that regret 
is irrational for moral mistakes that fall below the given threshold of gravity. This 
is implausible. For instance, in a case like Acting, Greta would not be making any 
mistake if she did regret her past mistake and her actual life path.
What we need, again, is an account according to which both regret and the 
lack thereof are permissible attitudes with respect to past moral mistakes, at least 
insofar as said mistakes were not too grave. Fatalism about the past, in either of 
its forms, cannot have this permissivist upshot. 
The temporal asymmetry in our attitudes toward moral imperfection might 
also remind us of the bias toward the future famously examined by Derek Parfit: 
we tend to prefer that bad things be in our past rather than our future. If we could 
show that this tendency is actually rational and not a mere bias, perhaps this 
would help solve the problem of temporal asymmetry.15 Not directly, because 
the question we have been discussing is not about choosing between the past 
and the future as the temporal location for our moral mistakes.16 But even so, 
if the temporal bias were rational, this would seem to entail that we have weak-
er reasons to care about our past moral failings than about our future mistakes, 
which might account for the cases in which we are interested: e.g., if it is rational 
for Tyler to give less weight to the moral disvalue of his past mistake than to a 
similar mistake in the future, then his self-interest and other types of nonmoral 
value might outweigh moral considerations retrospectively but not prospectively.
However, this is not a good account of the temporal asymmetry. It is im-
plausible that what goes on in cases like Acting and Lying is that people care less 
about their past mistakes than about their future ones. Or, to put it differently, it 
would seem perfectly reasonable for someone to treat his past and future moral 
mistakes as equally important, and yet to affirm his actual life path while wanting 
to be morally better in the future. The rationality of these asymmetric attitudes is 
15 Parfit, Reasons and Persons. I will not discuss here any attempts to justify the bias toward 
the future. But see, e.g., the evolutionary justification proposed by Horwich, Asymmetries in 
Time; and Dyke and Maclaurin, “‘Thank Goodness That’s Over,’” for a critical response.
16 We could have it all, as it were: we could both wish that we had never made certain mistakes 
and want to avoid making similar mistakes again. 
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still left unexplained.17 The proposal that I defend fills this explanatory gap: it is 
not because we care less about our past mistakes that we can rationally affirm our 
actual life paths, but because we are attached to particular valuable things in our 
past and committed to our biographical identity, while our prospective attitudes 
are not influenced by such attachments.
Another intuitively plausible response to our puzzle would be that regret for 
our past mistakes is undesirable because psychologically harmful. Moreover, it 
might be argued, regret is inimical to the goal of avoiding moral mistakes in the 
future, because it undermines our confidence and self-worth. We need to forgive 
ourselves in order to find the strength to improve, as well as for the sake of our 
well-being.18 A virtue of this proposal is that it can allow for the rational permis-
sibility of regret in cases where its instrumental disvalue is outweighed by the 
moral disvalue of our past mistakes.
However, these pragmatic considerations do not seem to capture what goes 
on in the relevant cases either. Our main reasons for affirming our imperfect 
past intuitively concern the content of our life path as such, rather than the pro-
spective benefits of making peace with our mistakes: we look back at our lives, 
discover that we are attached to some of their particular ingredients, and there-
fore do not wish that things had gone differently. My proposal makes good on 
this intuition. Moreover, remember that we have been talking about regret as a 
retrospective preference, rather than about the various affective states typically 
associated with this preference, and mere retrospective preferences are arguably 
much less harmful than emotions such as guilt or shame.
A different pragmatic approach to the temporal asymmetry would focus on 
the instrumental value of moral mistakes for our moral growth. We learn from 
our mistakes, it might be argued, and this gives us reason to affirm our imperfect 
life path, without supporting a preference for making similar mistakes again, giv-
en that doing so would not deliver the same educational benefits. 
Now, it may well be true that some moral mistakes enable our access to cer-
tain moral truths or help build our character. But this cannot be the full story, or 
17 Moreover, insofar as it is rational to care more about how well our lives will go in the future 
than about our past well-being, it is even more mysterious why we would prefer to do the 
morally right thing in the future while not wishing that we had acted rightly in the past, 
given that the balance between moral demands and self-interest is assumed to be the same 
from both perspectives.
18 See, e.g., Lieberman, “Why You Should Stop Being So Hard on Yourself,” for a summary of 
recent psychological research on the negative impact of self-criticism. See also Card, The 
Atrocity Paradigm, who suggests that some self-forgiveness may be required for self-respect, 
even for evil deeds (210). Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for drawing my attention to 
this passage.
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even the main story, about our asymmetric attitudes toward moral imperfection, 
as it does not account for two important categories of cases. First, even when we 
do learn from our mistakes, we can still reasonably affirm our actual past when 
comparing it to a life path in which we would have made the same moral prog-
ress through other means, e.g., by learning from others.19 Second, some moral 
mistakes may not lead to any gain in moral knowledge or any improvement in 
our character. For instance, we might have already known that we ought to have 
done the right thing, but we succumbed to temporary temptations. Or we lacked 
some relevant moral knowledge in the past, which we gained in the meantime, 
but in ways that had nothing to do with our past mistakes. (This might be the 
most common scenario for people who contemplate their past moral failings.) 
In all these cases, we can reasonably prefer our actual life path while wanting to 
be better in the future. The personal value and biographical identity proposal 
can account for this wide range of cases where the temporal asymmetry is pres-
ent, while the epistemic diagnosis cannot.
3. Personal Value and Biographical Identity
Two sources of support for conservative attitudes about the past can explain 
the temporal asymmetry in our attitudes toward moral imperfection: person-
al attachments and a commitment to our biographical identity. That is, we can 
reasonably affirm our morally imperfect lives if our mistakes have enabled some 
of our significant relationships or projects, or other attachments to particular 
valuable things, or if they have shaped who we are in a biographical sense. Such 
attachments can allow us to make peace with our past mistakes without shifting 
retrospectively the balance of reasons for our actions: it can still be the case that 
we objectively ought to have done the right thing, all things considered.20 More-
over, our prospective attitudes toward moral imperfection cannot be shaped to 
the same extent by personal attachments that we might develop as a result of 
making moral mistakes, or by things that may become part of our identity in the 
future. This is how the problem of temporal asymmetry is resolved.
To use the Acting example again, Greta may reasonably prefer her actual life 
19 Note, moreover, that when we do learn something valuable from our mistakes, but similar 
future mistakes would not deliver similar benefits, this means that there is a difference in 
objective reasons between our past circumstances and our future ones. So, strictly speaking, 
this is not the kind of case on which I have been focusing: I want to make sense of our 
asymmetric attitudes in cases where the balance of objective reasons would be the same for 
a future mistake as for a past mistake.
20 See Salow, “Partiality and Retrospective Justification,” for a discussion of whether personal 
attachments can retrospectively justify one’s actions.
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path because the mistake that she made enabled a significant relationship to 
which she is now attached or has led to other events and experiences that are 
central to her identity. She may also predict that doing the wrong thing again 
would enable a new significant relationship or shape a new chapter of her life sto-
ry, and that if this were to happen, she would then have sufficient reason to retro-
spectively affirm her actual life path once more. But those possible future attach-
ments do not presently give Greta equally strong reasons to want to be morally 
imperfect. To be clear, prospective attachments can factor into the balance of 
reasons for our actions, e.g., someone might decide to have a child because she 
sees the parent–child relationship as distinctly valuable. But such merely possi-
ble attachments do not have the same normative force as our actual attachments 
to specific aspects of our lives: actual personal attachments matter more than 
merely possible ones, and in a way that is not reducible to their objective value. 
I take this feature to be central to the very notion of personal attachment. For 
this reason, our actual attachments can support a preference for how our life has 
unfolded, when compared to morally better lives that we could have had, while 
the prospect of similar attachments in the future need not support a preference 
for making similar moral mistakes again.21
Someone might object that this asymmetry in normative force between ac-
tual and merely possible attachments, or between actual and possible ingredi-
ents of our identity, only shows that our personal attachments and biographical 
identity do shift the balance of objective reasons for our past actions, which goes 
against how I described cases like Acting and Lying in setting up the puzzle. For 
example, it might be argued that Greta can now recognize reasons for her past 
moral mistake that were not available to her at the time of action, such as the 
actual personal attachments enabled by that mistake.
However, the special weight carried by actual attachments in retrospection 
goes beyond the objective reasons that someone had at a time when those at-
tachments did not yet exist. Again, this is not to deny that prospective attach-
ments can affect the balance of objective reasons for our actions. The fact that a 
moral mistake is likely to enable a significant personal attachment can provide 
some reason to commit that mistake. Similarly, the personal attachments enabled 
21 To be clear, I am not suggesting that our actual attachments only matter when we think 
about the past. Existing personal attachments and a commitment to our actual identity can 
also play a normative role when we deliberate about the future, and in particular they can 
favor being morally imperfect in the future, e.g., we may be moved to make choices that fit 
who we are, or that privilege the relationships and projects that we especially care about, 
rather than comply with impersonal moral demands. But in most cases, we can give proper 
weight to our existing attachments and our actual identity while avoiding moral mistakes 
that we made in the past.
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by a past mistake can be retrospectively recognized as favoring that mistake, in-
sofar as there is objective value in developing such attachments. But when per-
sonal attachments become actual, they gain a normative significance that they 
did not have before and can support preferences that are not aligned with our 
judgments of value. This is why, for instance, it is reasonable for Greta to form 
the following combination of attitudes: I retrospectively prefer my actual life 
path because the decision to work with director X has enabled a significant re-
lationship of mine and has shaped who I am, but it is still true that, all things 
considered, I objectively ought to have done the right thing.
This proposal allows for reasonable regret for what might have been—not 
only in cases of grave moral mistakes, where regret might be rationally required, 
but also in cases like Acting and Lying, where lack of regret is permissible. In 
other words, the moral disvalue of our mistakes may sometimes decisively out-
weigh our personal attachments and the commitment to our identity, while 
in other circumstances neither regret nor affirmation is rationally required: in 
those cases, it is up to us whether to take facts about our personal attachments or 
biographical identity as good enough reasons for lack of regret. 
Someone might agree that the temporal asymmetry is explained by the spe-
cial weight we give to particular things in our past, and still wonder why only 
bearers of personal value and ingredients of our biographical identity can play 
this normative role. Why not include all particular valuable things in our lives 
among the sources of support for conservative attitudes about the past? 
The answer is that, unlike other forms of valuing, personal attachments 
and the commitment to one’s identity are constitutively governed by a norm 
of non-fungibility. For instance, someone is not really attached to a significant 
project in his life if he is willing to replace it with something of greater value as 
soon as he has the chance. Similarly, if a person is genuinely committed to who 
she is, she must be disposed to prefer that identity to other identities that she 
might have, including morally better identities.22 This norm of non-fungibility 
22 This is not to say that someone who is committed to her identity must be disposed to prefer 
that identity at all costs, or over any other alternative. But she must give some weight to the 
fact that this is who she is, when comparing her actual identity to better alternatives. The 
same holds for personal attachments to persons, projects, etc.: non-fungibility does not en-
tail that we should treat the things we are attached to as absolutely irreplaceable, no matter 
how great the difference in value is between them and other possible objects of attachment. 
Moreover, how much weight we should give to our actual attachments will depend on the 
strength and quality of those attachments, e.g., someone whose marriage is coming apart 
may reasonably ponder ending it and seeking a new romantic relationship that would be 
more valuable. But even in such cases, we will still give some special weight to our actual 
attachments, when comparing them with merely possible ones—if we do not, then those 
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does not apply, for instance, to all bearers of prudential value. The fact that some-
thing contributed to my well-being is not a reason to prefer it to other things 
that would have made my life even better. And there is no reason to assign great-
er weight to things that have actually made my life good for me than to things 
that will equally contribute to my well-being in the future. This is, again, why 
an explanation in terms of self-interest cannot resolve the problem of temporal 
asymmetry, and more generally why not all particular valuable things in our past 
give us reason for conservative attitudes.23
Personal value has been much discussed in contemporary moral philosophy, 
including its role in retrospection.24 While the influence of our self-conception 
on our retrospective attitudes has also been explored before, less has been said 
about what this notion of identity amounts to and its normative force.25 Let me 
end, then, with some remarks on the nature of biographical identity and how it 
interacts with our retrospective attitudes and moral judgments, and by address-
ing a skeptical worry about its ethical significance.
It has become common to distinguish between metaphysical and ethical 
notions of personal identity: metaphysical questions about our essence and 
persistence as individuals do not seem to concern the same type of identity 
as ethical questions about authenticity and who we are in a qualitative sense.26 
A non-metaphysical type of identity is involved in conservative retrospection. 
actual attachments have simply ceased to exist. Thanks to John Monteleone for discussion 
on this issue.
23 Thus, I am rejecting here the conservatism about value defended by Cohen, “Rescuing 
Conservatism,” according to which all particular valuable things give us reason to wish to 
see them preserved, at the expense of new and better things, insofar as this general conser-
vatism is meant to apply to attitudes about the past as well. Properly arguing against this 
view goes beyond the scope of my paper, but I should point out that, when discussing a 
counterexample proposed by David Wiggins, Cohen himself tentatively concedes that his 
view might be too strong, and that perhaps conservative attitudes should be directed at only 
certain categories of valuable things.
24 See Scheffler, “Relationships and Responsibilities”; and Kolodny, “Which Relationships 
Justify Partiality?” for canonical treatments of the ethical significance of personal attach-
ments. Cohen, “Rescuing Conservatism,” discusses personal value as a source of support 
for conservative prospective attitudes. On the role of personal value in retrospection, see 
Adams, “Existence, Self-Interest, and the Problem of Evil”; McMahan, “Preventing the Ex-
istence of People with Disabilities”; Harman, “‘I’ll Be Glad I Did It’ Reasoning and the 
Significance of Future Desires” and “Transformative Experiences and Reliance on Moral 
Testimony”; and Wallace, The View from Here.
25 For the influence of our self-conception on our retrospective attitudes, see especially Ad-
ams’ and Harman’s papers cited in the previous footnote.
26 See, e.g., Schechtman, The Constitution of Selves; and DeGrazia, Human Identity and Bioeth-
ics.
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More precisely, our conservative attitudes toward our own moral imperfection 
are often rooted in a commitment to who we are in a biographical or narrative 
sense. This identity is partly constructed by ourselves, through the stories we tell 
about our lives, in which we assign a central role to certain events, experiences, 
etc., but it also depends on objective facts about the world: for instance, being a 
great soccer player could not be part of my biographical identity, no matter what 
I told myself, given that I am terrible at this sport.27
If we judge that something in our past has become part of who we are and 
we endorse our biographical identity, this gives us reason to prefer our actual 
life path, even if we believe that, all things considered, we ought to have pur-
sued a morally better life. Importantly, this applies not only to valuable things 
in our past: disvaluable things, e.g.,  experiences of adversity and hardship or 
even moral mistakes, can also become part of our identity and thus support 
conservative preferences about the past. 
The reasons for conservative attitudes provided by the commitment to our 
biographical identity are defeasible: if our moral mistakes were grave enough, 
regret might be rationally required. Indeed, in some cases the fact that a given 
mistake has come to shape our identity might even strengthen our reasons for 
regret. Think again of the Christopher Wylie case: it would be reasonable for 
him to regret not only his work for Cambridge Analytica, but also the fact that 
this career choice has come to define his identity.
Moreover, even in cases where lack of regret is reasonable, we should allow for 
reasonable divergence between people’s retrospective preferences: for instance, 
if someone in Greta’s position did not assign much weight to her biographical 
identity and regretted her morally imperfect life path, she need not be making 
any normative mistake. It is generally our prerogative whether to endorse our 
biographical identity and how much weight to give it in retrospection—again, at 
least if our moral mistakes were not too grave.
Someone might worry that our biographical identity cannot serve as a good 
foundation for conservative attitudes toward the past, given that the stories we 
27 This characterization of biographical identity is inspired by the narrative conceptions of 
identity defended by Schechtman, The Constitution of Selves, and DeGrazia, Human Iden-
tity and Bioethics, and by psychological research on life stories and narrative identity, e.g., 
Cohler, “Personal Narrative and Life Course”; Habermas and Bluck, “Getting a Life”; and 
Harbermas, “Autobiographical Reasoning.” I cannot offer here a full account of biographical 
identity, including a discussion of the challenges faced by theories like Schechtman’s and 
DeGrazia’s, e.g., how exactly to reconcile the idea of narrative identity as our own creation 
with the thought that the narratives we tell ourselves can be misguided. But I hope that the 
brief remarks I offer give the reader an intuitive grasp on this notion and the role it plays in 
retrospection.
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tell about our lives are often unreliable: we tend to ignore events that do not fit 
our general sense of who we are, particularly when it comes to our moral fail-
ings.28
In response to this skeptical worry, let me first note that I have been talking 
about cases where people do acknowledge their past moral failings, rather than 
ignore those mistakes or reinterpret them away. One cannot make peace with a 
moral mistake if one does not acknowledge it as a mistake.
However, the worry might persist: even if we see certain events in our past as 
moral failings, perhaps we find it easy to make peace with these mistakes due to our 
general tendency to see ourselves retrospectively as better than we actually were, 
e.g., to ignore other mistakes that we have made and thus misjudge the overall 
moral value of our lives, or to think that those mistakes were not representative 
of our character. Thus, the commitment to our biographical identity is not a 
suitable ground for conservative attitudes, insofar as autobiographical stories 
are plagued by self-deception. Or so the argument would go.
This is indeed a disquieting thought about the role of biographical identity 
in retrospection, and I cannot offer here a clear criterion for distinguishing the 
good cases in which self-told narratives are reliable enough to support conser-
vative retrospection from the bad cases in which they are not. But I do believe 
that there are good cases, and my thesis about the retrospective import of bi-
ographical identity should only be taken to apply to such cases in which we are 
not vastly deluded about who we are: if the moral mistakes in our past were not 
too damning, we can reasonably prefer our imperfect life path to alternative lives 
that would have been morally better but too different, and thus alienated from 
who we are.29
Rutgers University–Newark
camil.golub@rutgers.edu
28 See Harrelson, “Narrative Identity and Diachronic Self-Knowledge,” for a recent discussion 
of skeptical worries about autobiographical stories.
29 For helpful comments and discussion, I would like to thank Kati Balog, Andy Cullison, Ja-
son D’Cruz, Raffaella De Rosa, Asia Ferrin, Daniel Fogal, Alida Liberman, Irene Liu, Clau-
dia Mills, Rob MacDougall, Jordan MacKenzie, John Monteleone, Jake Wojtowicz, Mike 
Zhao, two anonymous reviewers for this journal, and audiences at the Icahn School of Med-
icine, DePauw University, Trinity College Dublin, and Le Moyne College.
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